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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
The Fertilizer Institute ("TFI") appeals the decision of the 
district court upholding the Environmental Protection 
Agency's ("EPA") addition of nitrate compounds to the Toxic 
Release Inventory ("Inventory"). We will affirm for the 




FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
In January 1994, the EPA proposed a rule adding 313 
chemicals to the Inventory pursuant to the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986 (the 
"EPCRA"). See 42 U.S.C. SS 11023(c)-(d). In November 1994, 
the EPA adopted a final rule which included 286 of the 313 
chemicals originally proposed. Nitrate compounds were 
among the chemicals added based on chronic health 
effects, specifically because nitrate compounds cause 
human infants to develop methemoglobinemia, a condition 
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that prevents proper transportation throughout the body of 
oxygen via red blood cells and causes damage to vital 
organs. The EPA characterized this consequence to be a 
"severe or irreversible . . . chronic health effect," one of the 
criteria in the statute. See 42 U.S.C. S 11023(d)(2)(B). 
 
In May 1996, TFI, a trade association representing the 
fertilizer industry whose members use nitrate compounds, 
filed a complaint in the district court challenging the EPA's 
placement of nitrate compounds on the Inventory. TFI gave 
three reasons for its challenge to the nitrates listing: 
inadequate notice of the EPA's intent to place nitrates on 
the list under the EPA's interpretation and application of 
chronic health effects; inadequate response to the 
comments submitted by TFI; and misapplication of the 
statutory criteria, which resulted in the EPA's overstepping 
its authority under S 11023(d). Both TFI and the EPA filed 
motions for summary judgment. 
 
Reviewing the overall record, the district court held that 
the EPA provided adequate notice to the parties, including 
"particularly sophisticated commenters like TFI who are 
familiar with nitrate compounds." Dist. Ct. Mem. Op. at 19. 
The district court also concluded that the EPA adequately 
responded to the comments submitted by several 
organizations, including TFI. Id. at 22. The court observed 
that the criticisms challenged the EPA's conclusions, but 
not the evidence the agency relied on in reaching them. Id. 
at 21-22. Finally, the district court concluded that the EPA 
had shown that the record supported the decision to 
include nitrates because of the chronic health effects they 
can produce in infants. Id. at 24-25. Thus, the district 
court upheld the agency's addition of nitrates to the 
Inventory, and granted summary judgment in favor of the 
EPA. 
 
TFI filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 








Standard of Review 
 
In considering summary judgment decisions, we review 
the case de novo, applying the same standard that the 
district court did. See Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 
520, 526 (3d Cir. 1995). In the context of agency decision 
making, we review the agency record directly. See Troy 
Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 
Courts review agency decision making with deference. 
The Administrative Procedure Act provides that a court 
should "set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 
found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. S 706(2)(A). 
Grounds for concluding that the agency acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously include its reliance on factors outside 
those Congress intended for consideration, a complete 
failure by the agency to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, or an agency's explanation contrary to, or 
implausible in light of, the evidence. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see also Pennsylvania Dep't of 
Pub. Welfare v. United States Dep't of Health and Human 
Servs., 101 F.3d 939, 943 (3d Cir. 1996) (reversal 
appropriate if action "irrational, not based on relevant 
factors, or outside statutory authority"). 
 
We have often stated that in assessing the record, the 
court should not substitute its own judgment for the 
scientific expertise possessed by the agency. See, e.g., 
Southwestern Pa. Growth Alliance v. Browner, 121 F.3d 
106, 117 (3d Cir. 1997). Furthermore, the courts are 
deferential to an agency's interpretation of a statute in 
situations in which "Congress has been either`silent or 
ambiguous' " on the question under consideration. Id. at 
116 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). 
 






The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know 
Act authorizes the EPA to add chemicals and compounds to 
the Inventory under three general criteria, broadly 
described as acute effects, chronic effects, and 
environmental effects. Only the first two are relevant to the 
analysis here. The relevant provision states: 
 
       A chemical may be added if the Administrator 
       determines, in his judgment, that there is sufficient 
       evidence to establish any one of the following: 
 
       (A) The chemical is known to cause or can 
       reasonably be anticipated to cause significant 
       adverse human health effects at concentration levels 
       that are reasonably likely to exist beyond facility site 
       boundaries as a result of continuous, or frequently 
       recurring, releases. 
 
       (B) The chemical is known to cause or can 
       reasonably be anticipated to cause in humans -- 
 
        (I) cancer or teratogenic effects, or 
 
        (ii) serious or irreversible -- 
 
         (I) reproductive dysfunctions, 
 
         (II) neurological disorders, 
 
         (III) heritable genetic mutations, or 
 
         (IV) other chronic health effects. 
 
S 11023(d)(2) (emphasis added). Subsection (A) governs 
chemicals that have acute effects and imposes two 
determinations on the EPA: significant adverse human 
health effects and a minimum level of exposure. In 
contrast, the chronic effects standard of subsection (B) 
requires only a determination of "serious or irreversible . . . 
chronic health effects," and does not refer to any level of 
exposure. 
 
We consider TFI's challenge to the EPA's addition of 
nitrate compounds to the Inventory under the "chronic 
health effects" language of subsection (B)(ii)(IV). 
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1. The Meaning and Application of "Chronic Effects" 
 
First, TFI asserts that the EPA changed its definition and 
then applied the new definition of "chronic health effects" 
when adding nitrates to the Inventory, but without 
explaining the reasons for doing so. TFI compares the 
language in the EPA's Hazard Assessment Guidelines for 
Listing Chemicals on the Toxic Release Inventory, Revised 
Draft (26 May 1992) ("Draft HAG"), with the determination 
made in the final rule. The Draft HAG states that chronic 
health effects "result from long-term exposure to a 
chemical." Draft HAG at 29 (emphasis added). By contrast, 
the EPA's listing for nitrates is premised on the long-term 
(i.e., chronic) consequences of methemoglobinemia. 
 
It is well-established that an agency may not depart from 
"established precedent without announcing a principled 
reason for such a reversal." Donovan v. Adams Steel 
Erection, Inc. 766 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Local 
777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862 
(D.C. Cir. 1978)). Nor may an agency "chang[e] course by 
rescinding a [promulgated] rule" without providing "a 
reasoned analysis for the change." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 42. Either of these actions would be 
arbitrary and capricious. 
 
However, we are not persuaded that the EPA has 
abandoned its prior practices here in the way that the 
precedents require to trigger an explanation. In Adams 
Steel, the agency departed from a series of agency- 
established and court-established precedential standards, 
and in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, the agency departed from 
an already promulgated rule, as distinguished from the 
unpromulgated Draft HAG, upon which TFI relies. 
Significantly, TFI did not challenge the evidence on which 
the EPA relied either in the rulemaking or in the district 
court. We conclude that the EPA was free to exercise its 
discretion and expert judgment in relying on a definition of 
other chronic effects that does not require long-term 
exposure. We agree with the D.C. Circuit's conclusion that 
the EPA did not abandon any long-held policy in 
promulgating this rule. See Troy Corp., 120 F.3d at 287. 
 
However, TFI also contends that the EPA has used the 
phrase "other chronic effects" inconsistently within the final 
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rule at issue. TFI apparently argues that because the EPA 
now views persistence beyond the period of exposure as a 
characteristic of chronic effects, four chemicals that it listed 
under acute effects (subsection (A)) (methyltrichlorosilane, 
trimethyltrichlorosilane, brucine, and phosphine) should 
have been listed under chronic effects (subsection (B)), 
because they may cause permanent injury. TFI Br. at 22. 
 
The EPA concedes that it withdrew voluntarily 
two of the chemicals (methyltrichlorosilane and 
trimethyltrichlorosilane) from the Inventory. EPA Br. at 31 
(citing Deletion of Certain Chemicals, 63 Fed. Reg. 19838 
(1998)). With regard to the two remaining chemicals, it 
considered factors such as the manifestation period and 
duration of the effect and concluded that these chemicals 
"kill too quickly for their effects to be considered `chronic.' " 
EPA Br. at 31. Applying this distinction involves precisely 
the type of scientific expertise that this court will not 
second guess. See Southwestern Pa. Growth Alliance, 121 
F.3d at 117. 
 
But TFI presses the inconsistency argument further, 
referring to related litigation over the 1994 rule. See Troy 
Corp., 120 F.3d 277, aff'g in part and rev'g in part National 
Oilseed Processors Ass'n v. Browner, 924 F. Supp. 1193 
(D.D.C. 1996). In Troy Corp., the court considered, inter 
alia, industry objections to the EPA's listing of bronopol as 
a chronic toxicant. The studies on which the EPA based 
that listing showed that bronopol produced severe 
gastrointestinal irritation in tested animals, suggesting that 
it was an acute toxicant. The EPA relied on the duration of 
exposure in placing the chemical under (B), even though 
that subsection does not have an exposure requirement. 
The Troy Corp. court was concerned because previously in 
dealing with hydrogen sulfide the agency had looked not to 
the length of the exposure but to the length of the effect. 
The Troy Corp. court, therefore, directed the EPA to 
reconsider whether its listing of bronopol in the Inventory 
was inconsistent with its approach in the earlier case. Id. at 
291. 
 
Here, the EPA listed nitrates based on the chronic effect, 
not the duration of the exposure, which is consistent with 
its approach to hydrogen sulfide. Had it based this listing 
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on duration of exposure, TFI would have been able to argue 
that the EPA was being inconsistent with the hydrogen 
sulfide listing. Therefore, the EPA was not arbitrary and 
capricious in its listing of nitrates under subsection (B). 
 
2. Statutory Construction 
 
TFI next contends that in listing nitrates the EPA 
interpreted the statutory language of "serious or 
irreversible," 42 U.S.C. S 11023(d)(2)(B)(ii)(IV), in a way that 
makes the term "chronic" superfluous, which would be an 
impermissible statutory construction. See Babbitt v. Sweet 
Home Chapter of Communities for Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 
698 (1995); United Steel Workers v. North Star Steel Co., 5 
F.3d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1993). Specifically, it argues that "the 
fact that an adverse effect may persist past the period of 
exposure is simply another way of stating that the effect is 
`serious or irreversible.' " TFI Br. at 25. 
 
As the EPA notes, not all chronic effects are irreversible, 
and to demonstrate that the word "chronic" retains 
meaning distinct from "irreversible" it gives the example of 
a stomach ulcer that might develop over a long period of 
time and last a long time but be medically reversible. 
Similarly, not all "chronic effects" are necessarily serious, 
because, as the EPA notes, a minor effect might last a long 
time. 
 
The mere existence of some overlap between terms does 
not mean that the EPA's interpretation of the statutory 
language is so unreasonable that it cannot be accepted. See 
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 698 (agency 
interpretation creating overlap with other words in statute 
a function of act's purposes not agency unreasonableness). 
The deference that we owe to an agency's interpretation of 
its own statute, particularly one this technical, requires at 
least that much. 
 
3. Notice of the Definition of "Chronic Effects" 
 
Finally, TFI contends that during the rulemaking process 
the EPA failed to notify the public that the basis for its 
listing of nitrate compounds as "chronic" was that they 
produce health effects that persist past the period of 
exposure. It argues that had it known that the EPA was 
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applying what TFI asserts is the "new `chronic effects' 
definition," TFI would have commented. 
 
In responding, the EPA first notes that TFI did not raise 
this issue in the district court. Instead, there it raised lack 
of notice that effects other than methemoglobinemia were 
the basis for listing nitrates. TFI has not disputed in its 
reply brief that the direction of its lack of notice argument 
in the district court was different than that it makes here. 
This alone would support ruling against TFI. In any event, 
the record supports the conclusion that TFI was adequately 
apprised of the definition that the EPA used. 
 
The rulemaking process requires an agency "to fairly 
apprise interested parties of all significant subjects and 
issues involved," American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 
F.2d 284, 291 (3d Cir. 1977) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), so that they can participate in the process. This 
policy is not undermined when an agency promulgates a 
final rule that does not mirror precisely the proposed rule 
outlined in the notice. A "substantially different" rule is 
permissible as long as the participants had sufficient notice 
at the start of the process. Id. at 293; accord Association of 
Oil Pipelines v. FERC, 83 F.3d 1424, 1432 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 
The EPA argues that the notice sufficiently apprised 
interested parties of its persistent effects rationale for 
listing nitrates under the chronic effects category, and that 
it merely applied what was a commonly used interpretation 
of "chronic effects." In its notice, it referred interested 
commenters to the scientific literature on which its 
conclusions were based. The EPA notes that at least one 
commenter understood that EPA would consider an effect 
chronic based on the effect's duration, and that 
commentator directed comments to that issue. Just as TFI 
could understand that it was not the methemoglobinemia 
condition itself, but the extended consequences of that 
condition, that warranted a listing under chronic effects, it 
could conclude that the EPA was relying on the persistent 
consequences after exposure. 
 
TFI was apprised sufficiently of the EPA's usage of 
persistence beyond exposure as the basis for the nitrates 
listing. Therefore, this final challenge fails. 
 






We have considered all of TFI's other contentions as well 
and conclude that it has failed to demonstrate that the EPA 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in listing nitrates on the 
Toxic Release Inventory because of their "serious or 
irreversible . . . chronic health effects." Thus, we will affirm 
the district court's grant of summary judgment for the EPA. 
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